

2005 BRAC COMMISSION HEARING

THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 2005

GEORGIA TECH HOTEL AND CONFERENCE CENTER

800 SPRING STREET, NW

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

ADJUTANT'S GENERAL AIR NATIONAL GUARD HEARING

COMMISSIONERS:

COMMISSIONER SAMUEL SKINNER

COMMISSIONER JAMES BILBRAY

COMMISSIONER HAROLD GEHMAN, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONER LLOYD NEWTON

CHAIR:

COMMISSIONER SAMUEL SKINNER

APPEARANCES :

COMMISSIONER GEHMAN

COMMISSIONER BILBRAY

COMMISSIONER SKINNER

COMMISSIONER NEWTON

DAN COWHIG, Deputy General Counsel

CERTIFIED

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: The afternoon hearing will come to order. I am Samuel Skinner, and I have been designated as the chairperson for this hearing as the Defense makes a reassignment commission as it deals with the Air National Guard issues. I am pleased today to be joined by my fellow commissioners, Jim Bilbray, Harold Gehman and Floyd Newton. They will be here today for the session as well.

The purpose of our hearing this afternoon is to hear testimony, first of all, from the Department of Homeland Security as well as representatives of the Adjutants General Association of the United States regarding the Department of Defense of BRAC recommendations. The commissioners have traveled throughout the nation visiting many installations and specifically Air National Guard bases. A number of issues have been raised and presented to the Commission regarding the Department of Defense's recommendations.

We have heard representatives of Air National Guard facilities speak of the potential negative aspects the recommendations would have on retention, recruitment and training. We've heard them tell us how airport -- aircraft relocations may not provide the optimum mix of how Guard support for

the Homeland Security mission may suffer. We have heard the adjutants general's concern that they were not an integral part of the Department of Defense's decision-making process as it relates to BRAC.

All of the above issues concern us as commissioners, the most important being the potential effect of the DoD recommendation of the Homeland Security mission. No mission is greater nor ever been more historically apparent in our duty to protect America's homeland. Since September 11th, 2001, our nation witnessed several state and local partners -- public partners working together like never before.

We've transformed our intelligence enforcement and response communities at the federal and state level. We have mobilized our air and sea defenses, including the United States Coast Guard, to adapt to this enhanced mission. With those concerns come this hearing, we have invited a representative of the Department of Homeland Security to testify to this impact. We are pleased to welcome Rear Admiral Tim Sullivan, who will speak in a minute. We've also invited the Adjutants General Association of the United States to provide issue-oriented testimony about the effects of the DOD recommendation and the effects that it will have

on the overall mission of the Air National Guard. We welcome Major General Lempke of Nebraska, the president of the association, and thank him for helping us coordinate the hearing and providing the distinguished panel before us.

Admiral Sullivan will begin with an opening statement, followed by General Lempke's statement. After General Lempke, we will have the opportunity to hear a statement from each of the attending TAG's, who will offer us their insights on this issue. Following the statements, the commissioners will have an opportunity to ask questions of our witnesses.

I now request our witnesses for this hearing to stand for the administration of the oath of office as required by the Base Closure Realignment Statute. The oath will be administered by Dan Cowhig.

(Panel sworn.)

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Normally, we take questions at the beginning of each section. And Admiral Sullivan, we might under normal circumstances ask questions of you right after you present. But if your schedule permits, I think we probably would like to hear from the members of the panel as well, and then I think we will probably

have some questions for you. And we will probably be better informed, our questions will probably be -- first of all, some of the answers may have been answered by the Guard presentation.

No. 2, we will be better informed to ask you questions after they present. So if that's all right with you, we will proceed along those lines.

With that, Admiral Sullivan.

Admiral Sullivan is an admiral in the United States Coast Guard. He has appeared here today not as an admiral of the United States Coast Guard, but he is a special advisor to the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security. Thank you.

ADMIRAL SULLIVAN: Yes, sir. Members of the 2005 Defense based closure realignment with the commission. Thank you for allowing me to testify before you today. I am here on behalf of Secretary Chertoff, who sends his regrets that he could not attend today's hearing. I am a rear admiral in the United States Coast Guard, an organizational element within the Department of Homeland Security. I appear before you today not as an officer of the United States Armed Forces, but as a representative of the Department.

The Commission's purpose, as directed by law, is to provide an objective, nonpartisan and

independent review and analysis of the lists of military installations and recommendations that the Department of Defense has issued.

Among the factors for your consideration are operational and financial impacts that base closures and realignments will have on securing and defending the Homeland.

I am here today to talk a little bit about the impact of base closures and realignment on the Department of Homeland Security's mission. I would like to start first by providing you with potential specific impacts on Homeland Security facilities and then close by addressing concerns within the broader context of homeland defense.

There are a number of components within DHS that have facilities co-located at Department of Defense installations. As well, DHS components often rely upon DoD for operational support. The proposed realignments and closings of the Department of Defense installations are expected, in general, to have limited impact on DHS's ability to carry out its mission. However, they do bear a financial impact.

The Coast Guard, with its long history of interoperability and shared infrastructure with the

Defense Department is the most impacted by the BRAC initiatives. The Commandant of the Coast Guard identified a category of potential efficiencies that could result from BRAC and two categories of financial impacts resulting from BRAC.

An example of potential efficiencies is evident on the West Coast, where realignment potentially frees up ground facilities and critical unrestricted air space at Naval Base Ventura County, California. There's potential for the Coast Guard to consolidate at Ventura, which offers a unique opportunity to co-locate several commands and achieve efficiencies in mission performance. Ventura is the only west coast location that meets all the Coast Guard requirements for a consolidated facility, with access to airspace that allows unrestricted UAV deployment. UAV deployment is an emerging capability for increasing maritime domain awareness in support of homeland security.

The first of two financial impacts of the BRAC proposal occurs in the cases where Department of Defense vacating a facility places a significant direct cost impact on Coast Guard mission performance. This is the case with the movement of the 102nd Air National Guard Squadron off the

Massachusetts Military Reservation at Cape Cod, closure of the Portsmouth Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, and closure of the Naval Station in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

In each of these three cases, the preferred Coast Guard option is to remain at the legacy site, establish a new fence line, and assume operations, security and maintenance for the new, smaller facility. For each of the two naval stations, the costs are estimated to be about \$1.5 million up front and an additional \$1.0 million recurring.

At Cape Cod, the costs associated with operating an airfield as the sole user are comparatively much larger. Most of the Coast Guard air stations share their operating costs with a public facility or multi-unit military facility. This will not be the case if the 102nd Air National Guard leaves Massachusetts. The 102nd Air National Guard's share of common airfield operating requirements totals about \$17 million per year. This figure, set upon by the Coast Guard, will reflect a very significant portion of the agency's discretionary spending. But if the Coast Guard were forced to move from the current site, there would

also be a significant cost impact one-time and recurring. Plus, there will be an opportunity cost if the Coast Guard is forced to move from the central location of its busy northeast U.S. operating area. This operation will increase mission response times beyond current accepted standards.

The second financial impact is increased support costs due to loss of Coast Guard access to the Department of Defense's housing, medical treatment facilities and supply sources. The Coast Guard has alternate sources for these forms of support, but it comes at an incremental cost. A very rough estimate puts this right in the 8 to \$10 million range annually.

Housing and medical services on the local economies, are expected to cost more to our soldiers, sailors, airmen than on military facilities. And storage of mission critical components cost more at commercial facilities than the current arrangements at Department of Defense facilities.

The closing of Fort Gillem in Atlanta, Georgia could force the relocation of the FEMA Logistics Center in Atlanta. The logistics center

is currently located on the premises of Fort Gillem and is one of five FEMA logistics centers in the United States strategically located to provide critical commodities and supplies during disaster response operations and/or national special security events. The logistics center in Atlanta primarily serves the Southeast United States region, and also provides backup and supplemental support for all the regions and states.

Fort Monmouth in New Jersey currently supports the FEMA Region II COOP Facility. This facility is 7,500 square feet and serves as a joint field office and a regional response coordination center. Travel time from New York City to these vital national response facilities is only 80 minutes, and the Army post offers significant backup communications capabilities.

Many of the proposed closures could affect potential sites selected for FEMA mobilization centers, which are used extensively during incidents of national significance. However, mobilization centers are temporary sites that are frequently relocated due to space issues or proximity to the affected jurisdiction.

As with the Coast Guard, alternate sites

are available but at an increased cost that is not within current budgetary flexibility.

With the few exceptions that I've noted, the base closures and realignment will have overall a limited impact on DHS and its mission. The effects are minimal in scope when compared to the overall effects of the BRAC recommendations. Of course, where BRAC decisions do have an impact on DHS, the realignment and closure process should afford adequate time to find and fund appropriate measures to protect our missions and support our people. When the final determination is released, the Department of Defense has two to six years to close or realign the facility. DHS will work with the Congress, Department of Defense, and state and local governments to develop mitigation strategies whenever DHS components are tenants of a Department of Defense facility slated for closure. DHS is also preparing plans to take advantage of intergovernmental transfer of properties that will enhance our mission performance in those cases where the total operating costs are favorable.

Protecting the United States from direct attack is the highest defense priority of our country. The military has traditionally secured the

United States by projecting power overseas. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 demonstrated that we are confronting fundamentally different challenges from those faced during the Cold War.

The base closure and realignment recommendations are important milestones and significant proposals when considering the Department of Defense's concept of an active, layered defense outline in the national defense strategy.

Providing the nation with timely, competent and responsive defense against airborne threats has been a vital component to this layered defense of the United States. This has been accomplished through a network of fighter aircraft that fly air patrol and air intercept missions. These aircraft are currently located at Regular, Reserve and Air National Guard bases located along the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Pacific coasts, and along our northern border. The Air Force's BRAC recommendations recognize that difficult decisions had to be made regarding air patrol and other Air Force missions.

My understanding is that the Air Force

BRAC recommendations call for ending Air National Guard fighter missions currently assigned to units in Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia, along with units in Illinois and Missouri. The Air Force has stated that new, more capable aircraft will be stationed at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska, Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, and Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada; and that these aircraft will then be capable of providing air patrol coverage for the Northwest, Northeast/Mid-Atlantic, Southeast, and Southwest quadrants of the United States.

According to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force was mindful of the need to address homeland defense requirements. We are confident that the Department of Defense and the Air Force will continue to be able to capably carry out its roles in homeland defense in the air domain, which supports our homeland security efforts at DHS.

We also understand that the transformation of the Army and National Guard requires a realignment of reserve component facilities. The Secretary of the Army noted that due to the sheer number of facilities and difficulty of comparing

reserve component capabilities to active component capabilities, he invited the adjutants general from each state and commanders from Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command to provide information for the analyses of reserve component facilities.

The Army identified existing or new facilities in the same demographic area to provide enhanced homeland defense, training and mobilization capabilities. The Army sought to create multi-component facilities -- guard, reserve and active -- and multi-service, joint facilities to further enhance mission accomplishment.

DHS understands the Army and National Guard's need to transform to best combat the asymmetrical threat to our nation, and we know that the Department of Defense fully considered homeland defense and homeland security in its recommendation.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to stick around for any questions that you might have today.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you.

The next witness will be Major General Roger Lempke, who is the adjutants general of the Nebraska National Guard and also president of the National Guard Association.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Thank you,
Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Adjutants General
Association, I'm sorry.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Correct. Thank
you, Commissioner.

Again, I am General Roger Lempke,
adjutants general for Nebraska, and president of the
Adjutants General Association of the United States.
The purpose of this panel here today of the
adjutants general is to summarize key BRAC issues
from the collective perspective of 54 adjutants
general.

Our testimony will focus on that portion
of the BRAC list that deals with the Air National
Guard because we believe it to be seriously flawed
and potentially harmful to the security of the
nation.

The adjutants general in each state and
territory is responsible for the readiness of their
respective Army and National Guard units. A state
employee, the adjutants general may also be
responsible for emergency management and also
homeland security. In fact, 23 adjuncts generals
have this responsibility in some form.

It is important to note that two voices are associated with the National Guard. The chief, National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant Steve Blum is a Title 10 officer charged with administering the National Guard and providing a link of communications between the states and the Department of Defense. Each adjutants general works for the state or territorial government and in this capacity speaks independently.

The Adjutants General Association of the United States brings together adjutants general of the several states to deal collectively with issues and speak with one voice to the chief, National Guard Bureau, and the nation.

This afternoon, I want to start out with making three points very clear: First, the Adjutants General Associations supports the overall BRAC process as legislated by Congress. We understand and support the need to transform the military and adapt to changing threats and conditions. From our perspective, much fine work has gone into the BRAC process.

No. 2, we support the process used by the Army to prepare its recommendations. The process has been inclusive from the beginning. Most

importantly, the Army recognizes the National Guard's vital role in homeland security while understanding that changing population demographics demanded that armory be updated and reserve center locations be updated and that greater use of joint facilities saves money and promotes training and readiness.

No. 3, the adjutants general were not involved with the Air Force BRAC process. Until very recently, adjutants general were excluded from the deliberations to develop the Air Force Future Total Force plan. This is the overarching guide used to develop the Air Force BRAC plan.

In fact, the adjutants general were only asked to participate in the FTP process in November 2004 and the first meeting which included our representatives was held in December of 2004. Reviewing the information set released by the Department of Defense has revealed that Air National Guard capabilities and operational efficiencies were not properly assessed, resulting in flawed recommendations.

I would like to introduce for the record today the following documents that buttress the testimony given here today. First, we have a hard

bound full report on BRAC Criterion, No. 2, Condition of Infrastructure. We have one copy of it today, and it's over at the end of the statement table. Statement from Governor Ruth Ann Miner, State of Delaware, to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. I think that's already within your handout, perhaps. Finally, a statement of Senator Kit Bond, Missouri, co-chairman of the Senate National Guard Caucus. We have copies of that item over here on the end of the table for review at your leisure.

In addition to me, this panel consists of other adjutants generals here to testify on key issues. Major General Bruce Tuxill will provide an overview of unique Air National Guard capabilities. Major General Greg Wayt will discuss recruiting and retention. Major General Mike Haugen will discuss optimum aircraft assigned for Air National Guard sites. Major General Allen Tackett will discuss infrastructure criteria assessment and considerations. Major General Frank Vavala will discuss potential impacts from the realignment enclave concept presented by the Air Force. Major General Martha Rainville will discuss community basing.

I will conclude with a discussion of homeland defense/homeland security considerations and recommendations, and then provide final recommendations to the committee.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: Thank you.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: General Tuxill?

MAJOR GENERAL LEMPKE: Thank you, sir.

COMMISSIONER SKINNER: We are just commenting. Obviously, you are efficient not only in your missions but also in the way you planned this. Thank you very much.

GENERAL TUXILL: Thank you. Good afternoon, I am Major General Bruce Tuxill. I am from Maryland in my state capacity. I will present facts relative to the capabilities of the Air National Guard.

The Air National Guard brings capabilities and relationships to the nation, state and local communities that are unique and critical to our security, safety and national interest. I will tell you how cost effective, efficient and relevant and skilled our Air National Guard is. When you call out the Guard, you call out America.

I will also talk about our unique dual role that works so well in security. The Air National Guard provides 40 percent of the Air Force's combat capability for 7.3 percent of the budget. Considering the Air National Guard's support of the National Defense Strategy, right now, to defend the homeland, we have 100 percent of the CONUS air defense mission. 49 percent of the tactical airlift. We have 45 percent of the tanker support.

Since September 11th, 2001, more than 225,000 Army and Air Guardsman have been mobilized. In fiscal year '05 to date, right now, Air National Guard has flown over 30,000 sorties and 41,000 optempo days for the Global War on Terror. Truly, we leverage volunteerism better than anyone else. The vast majority of the Guard Forces supporting the Global War on Terrorism is accomplished through volunteerism. Still Force-wide retention in the National Guard remains at an impressive 93.3 percent.

As far as infrastructure goes, Air National Guard units realize financial savings by their locations at civilian airports by sharing costs, thereby reducing costly city-like

infrastructure and personnel cost.

For efficient and relevant: The Air National Guard basing ensures our nation is ready to meet current and future defenses and challenges and dispersal of aircraft at civilian airports to our nation is sound military strategy and very practical, given the threat.

BRAC recommendations to close 29 flying units increases the threat to our infrastructure by centralizing assets and negatively affecting response times to our natural and man-made disasters. Through our relationships and associations with state and local authorities, we are able to meet critical demands during emergency or other unforeseen contingency.

As far as our experience and skill, we compare very favorably with our sister services. Average experience for an officer in the Air National Guard is 17.1 years; enlisted, almost 14 years. We capture and retain civilian skill sets and a level of maturity that simply are not available on a full-time basis. This relationship with the private sector is what makes us a unique force multiplier.

The Air National Guard has the appeal and

stability to attract professionals and skilled technicians who have made the personal decision to remain in one state. Often the members are prior-service military, who remain in their prime and willing to serve. The National Guard offers an alternative form of service to country which preserves taxpayer investment in military training and ensures the retention of the service members' experience and expertise.

When you call out the Guard, you call out America. The Guard connects the military to over 3600 communities. We take great pride being your hometown Air Force. Your Guard maintains a continuous sustainment throughout outstanding community support. That community support translates into a better understanding of the military objectives. The members of that community are immediately involved in our nation's national strategy and our nation's will. Your National Guard largely is responsible for the positive public image of the military through our community with our youth programs, civil air patrol and the like.

But what is truly unique about the Air National Guard and the National Guard as a whole is we are the only military organization with a state

mission. The National Guard maintains a legal authority dispersion across the nation and infrastructure level to support civil authorities at a moment's notice. In 23 of our 50 states, Adjutant General Lempke pointed out the responsibilities for the state emergency management. State relationships forged solely by the National Guard allow timely responses to disasters, natural and otherwise. The Guard will continue to respond to hurricanes, floods, forest fires, earthquakes and other natural and man-made disasters.

In conclusion, the Air National Guard model is one that has proven itself. It is effective. It works. On any given day, our citizen soldiers find themselves in Title 10, supporting a major combat or separation; Title 32, supporting homeland defense mission or State Active-Duty, responding to the home state defense requirements or homeland security.

We are a militia nation, dependent on our citizen soldiers. Americans willing to serve in the community and the nation is our heritage and the citizen soldier will be a critical part of our security contract.

MAJOR GENERAL WAYT: Commissioners, good

afternoon. I am Major General Greg Wayt. I will be discussing the BRAC principles. BRAC No. 1, recruiting and train, which as you can see in this slide must attract, develop and retrain Air Guard.

The Air Force recommendations will affect 13,000 military positions. Many closed bases do not have another base within 50 miles. Many realigned bases do not have another base within 50 miles as well, causing limited ability for airmen transfer to another base which will cause the additional stress on the recruiting requirements. The skills of our pilots and maintenance personnel will be lost.

This recommendation affects approximately 3400 full-time positions as well. The assumption is that our full-time personnel will follow the aircraft; most will not. Many of our full-timers will have to seek other employment. Do I have to tell you many of our personnel have interest activities of their own -- non-transferable between states or to the Air Force Reserve.

Let me give you one example. Most states have a tuition incentive. The Base for colleges using state-appropriated funds would not be transferable to another state or to the Air Force Reserve.

However, in the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group, records do not mention recruiting or retention. Rather than focus on fungible attributes like assigned personnel, the military value assessment stressed installation characteristics. The skill and esprit of a specific unit can be recreated elsewhere. There's also stated the skills in those guard units recognizing they are world-class can be recreated. It just takes time.

I would like to point out again the analytical process that was used. Under the scenario development phase, it shows the guiding principles that include BRAC principal No. 1: Recruit and train was to have been considered. This slide shows the military value. I want to point out military value recruiting and training was not considered for -- the cost of retaining our airmen at a future date. This slide shows here Criteria 7 only looks at the population in a metro sense and discusses it as a total population.

I point that out, using Ohio as an example here. Demographics need to include aircraft. Age 15 to 24 which is the ages we seek to become airmen in our great National Guard units. Nor was the

recruiting of units discussed as well throughout this process. You can see why this slide -- if you place bases in the right communities, recruiting will be enhanced.

I want to show you the next series of six slides. These are actual slides for the BCEG process. What I want to show you in these slides recruiting retention was not considered because at this base, a base that had been closed, you can see recruiting retention was never considered in deliberations.

Manpower was discussed but only discussed as what was being lost and what was being transferred. The deliberations considered input in the COBRA bottle. As you can see in this example, retraining costs were not considered as well. Cost of moving personnel were considered. As I told you, most of our full-timers are not going to be moving following aircraft.

Another MILCON slide was considered. Lastly and under summary charts, recruiting and retention was not considered as we move aircraft to different bases.

So I want to point out to you today, in summary, if you look at the Air National Guard as a

whole across the United States, 10 states that are outlined in yellow, with a strength of 96.7 or higher, they will be losing strength. There are seven states in the red borders, 96 percent or lower that will be gaining strength. This is just recruiting that are not considered throughout this process. We have a problem.

In closing, I will discuss the last slide. I want to talk about retention of the National Guard. Air National Guard retention rate is 93.9 percent rate as a whole. I tell you that because as well as service Air National Guard retaining personnel, this high retention rate not only saves dollars but it ensures that we have the skills and our newness to meet whatever mission comes before us. It ensures readiness. More importantly, if this recommendation goes forward, our retention rates will be dramatically impacted by our ability to recruit.

I will be followed by Major General Mike Haugen.

MAJOR GENERAL HAUGEN: Commissioners, my name is Mike Haugen, Adjutant General of the North Dakota National Guard. I will present information relative to the distribution of Air National Guard

primary aircraft for assigned PAA of the United States Air Force and through this BRAC process.

As you will see, the elimination and reassignment of air assets assigned to the Air National Guard creates significant gaps in homeland defense capabilities and also negatively impacts the ability of governors to respond to state emergencies. The Air Force plan makes assumptions regarding Air National Guard aircraft that is not supported by facts.

The overall plan creates a dispersal of Air National Guard state recourses and it clearly is based on offensive operations or expeditionary forces. Such movement negatively impacts immediacy of response, effectiveness and reliability of the National Guard to respond to both the state and federal missions. The defensive capabilities are nearly eliminated in some regions of the country as evidenced by the slides showing pre- and post-BRAC assets. This is a slide of pre-BRAC fighters.

We need to ask a fundamental question: Is our primary goal to protect our citizens or is it to have only a more streamlined way to go to war? With the stated No. 1 goal of our national defense strategy, 1421 strategy being defense of the

homeland, that question has already been asked. It clearly has not been adequately considered in the recommendations for Air National Guard assets in this background. Even without current strategy goal, defense of the homeland is a constitutional guarantee.

The Air Force PAA model is not coordinated with adjutant generals or governors of the states. Eliminated or downsizing Air National Guard assets in states without considering the state or the homeland defense team creates serious problems. A close look at the regional security assets reveals strong support for the larger cities and minimal, if any, support for the less populated areas. There are significant security risks along our northern border particularly in the remote areas. So removal of regional defense assets as proposed appears to be unwise at best.

You have already heard the potential negative impact on recruiting and retention in the current plan. Increase in aircraft to fewer areas will also negatively impact airspace utilization. One additional pilot adds eight sorties per month to a gaining unit. 17 additional pilots add 136 sorties per month. This is for inexperienced

pilots, those with less than 500 hours. Those are the ones we are -- have been -- through surveys have indicated they are likely to move to find a new flying position.

We believe the most critical error is the plan assumption and maintainers will follow the aircraft. This is simply not the case in the Air Guard. Our airmen have local jobs, their spouses have jobs, their children are established in local communities and schools.

In North Dakota, for example, we have conducted an informal survey of our pilots and believe that at most no more than 20 percent of the trained fighter pilots will leave the state.

The most telling result of the survey is that pilots who most likely leave are the junior pilots. Our experienced pilots, the captains, majors, lieutenant colonels with the ties to the community, they will not move. In addition to the loss of our most experienced pilots from the force, this will create an additional stress on the gaining units due to increased flying requirements and training.

The Air Force estimates that the cost to train a fighter pilot is \$4.8 million. In North

Dakota, the elimination of the fighter flying mission will cost at a minimum \$119 million in lost human capital. Something that was not measured.

The experienced pool of highly trained Air Guard members will also be gravely impacted and the training deficit that occurs will take years to stabilize. The United States Air Force has acknowledged the advantages of leveraging the experience of our pilots and maintainers and yet they have created a plan that will likely decimate that core value, by eliminating the very strength they wish to leverage.

Each state should also have Air National Guard flying missions to meet recruiting retention of our national defense needs. By working together and following these key tenants we can create a model that will increase efficiency, reduce costs and both maintain the state and national defense capability abilities.

The recommendation of the Air Force, therefore, in many instances, force structure changes are not intended for the BRAC process. Legislative programmatic changes and movement of air assets needlessly limits our ability to respond to ever-changing world situations. It makes no sense

tactically, strategically and economically. Let the CEOs, that is, the governors, the TAGS, National Guard chief and the United States Air Force make an informed decision that considers the critical means of all concerned.

The Air Force establishes the equipment requirement, funded and approved by Congress. Where to put it and how to meet the needs of the military to include the Air Guard and individual states needs to be a collaborative effort. The Air Force focus since the Cold War has been largely offensive or expeditionary in nature and doesn't effectively consider state and homeland defense requirements.

In conclusion, we request the Commission reject the DoD recommendations relative to Air National Guard PAA and direct the Department of Defense and Air Force to communicate and collaborate as it did with the Army and the Army National Guard with the National Guard Bureau adjutants generals and governors to create a model for Air Guard assets that adequately considers the needs of the states and homeland defense means.

Thank you for your consideration. I will be followed by General Tackett.

MAJOR GENERAL TACKETT: Thank you,

gentlemen. I am Major General Tackett. I am here today to talk about military value BRAC Criteria No. 2, Condition of Infrastructure. My staff focused the review of Criteria No. 2 Value Elements in the Airlift Mission Area due to our efforts supporting 130th Airlift Wing in Charleston. However, upon further research, we found consistent results in seven other measured areas as well.

For illustrative purposes, measurement of value for Criteria 2 in the Airlift Mission Area is broken down as follows: Condition of infrastructure gives you 41.5 percent. Key mission infrastructure, fuel hydrant systems, ramp area and serviceability, runway dimension and serviceability, hangar capability for large aircraft, level of mission encroachment, installation pavements quality. And then operating areas. Airspace attributes of DZ/LZ.

The scoring system for infrastructure as noted in the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group or BCEG meeting minutes is slanted toward large active-duty bases. For many of the questions in this criterion, a base had to have an excessively large size in order to score any points at all.

Obviously, this strongly favors large active-duty installations and is biased against

smaller Air National Guard bases. In the airlift category the scoring matrix awards no points for runway lengths less than 7,000 feet, ramp areas less than 137,000 square yards, bases with no fuel hydrant dispensing system or bases not located within 150 miles of an approved drop zone or assault landing zone. Such scoring obviously encourages infrastructure larger than necessary for Air National Guard missions, a wasteful allocation of resources.

According to the scoring matrix, this value counts for 41.5 percent of the overall unit military value, the heavy emphasis on this physical infrastructure minimizes focus in other areas like mission capable rates, low operating costs, aircrew proficiency, aircraft maintenance experience and strength and retention levels.

Our Air National Guard wings are right sized to accomplish their mission today and most can easily expand without excess requirements of maintaining over 137,000 square yards of ramp space and 7,000 feet of runway.

Other areas measured in Criteria 2 are hangar capability, mission encroachment and installations pavement quality. Again, for pavement

quality if total ramp area is less than 137,000 square yards, you receive zero points, regardless of the age, specifications or the construction standard of the ramp pavement.

As an example, an eight PAA C-130 unit is only authorized a maximum 73,230 square yards of serviceable ramp space by the Air National Guard handbook, 32-1084, Air National Guard standards facility requirements, and it would be in violation of the standards in order to score any points in this measurement.

But the other point that we really need to make is that we don't need the 137,000 square yards of ramp space to accomplish our mission with eight aircraft. Nor do we need 137,000 square yards to park 12 aircraft. In fact, we can park 12 C-130s on our ramp space based on the standard for eight aircraft. The runway criterion is another example of flawed measuring. Airlift units don't need a 7,000-foot runway as the 130th has proven by safely operating C-130s out of Yeager Airport since 1975. We have also had C-17s and C-5s regularly operate in and out of Yeager in support of multiple deployments and exercises.

Our research reflected the same results

